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CLASS ACTIONS IN THE FwH CiRcuT
S. Ann Saucer*
Few rules of procedure have inspired more recent controversy than Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, defining federal class actions.1 Some jurists have
described class actions as "extraordinary proceedings with extraordinary poten-
tial for abuse."2 Others believe that all sides to a dispute may receive "the best
solution possible"3 through class adjudication. Adherents to the latter view pro-
mote expanded application of the class action vehicle. Both sides employ dis-
parate interpretations of Rule 23 to defend or decry new uses of the Rule.
Judicial pressure is likely to fuel amendment, at least regarding some facets of
the Rule.4
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has played a major role in the proce-
dural polemic, as the court recently has issued opinions in two of the most ambi-
tious class actions attempted to date: the putative class of the nation's cigarette
addicts and the nationwide settlement class designed to compensate future
asbestos-related injuries.' This article discusses these and other recent Fifth
Circuit decisions defining class actions and their operation in this circuit. Also
discussed is the national response to the Fifth Circuit's analysis in this field.
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Inherent in the class action device is the fiction that numerous absent parties in
the defined class are represented by a few, selected class members. The repre-
sentative fiction employed by the class action procedure poses unique jurisdic-
tional problems in the contexts of standing and diversity. Two recent Fifth
Circuit decisions tackle the conflicts between class representation and the factual
requisites underpinning federal jurisdiction.
* Associate, Silber Pearlman, P.C., Dallas, Texas. From 1991 to 1992, Ms. Saucer served as law clerk to Chief
Judge Henry A. Politz, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Ms. Saucer appeared as counsel of
record in two of the class action cases discussed in this article, Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996) and In re Asbestos Litigation (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996). This article is
not intended as a partisan commentary and is limited to a discussion of the reported decisions.
1. For example, in one recent class action decision, which the United States Supreme Court decided to
review, the federal appellate court described the litigation as invoking wide sweeping and substantive issues:
"Every decade presents a few great cases that force the judicial system to choose between forging a solution to
a major social problem on the one hand, and preserving its institutional values on the other. This is such a
case." Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996), aff'd
sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
2. General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W2d 949, 953 (Tex. 1996) (quoted in In re Asbestos Litig.
(Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 E3d 963, 999 (5th Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting)).
3. In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d at 993.
4. For example, the Third Circuit has suggested that the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules amend Rule 23 to resolve the present controversies. Georgine, 83 E3d at 635. Rule 23 is currently the
subject of study by the Committee. Id.
5. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Asbestos Litig.(Flanagan v.
Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
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A. Diversity and Supplemental Jurisdiction in Class Action: Abbott Laboratories
The Fifth Circuit's controversial decision in In re Abbott Laboratories' defines
the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction7 in the
context of class actions. The Abbott Court held that supplemental jurisdiction
may be exercised over class members demanding less than $50,001 in diversity
cases.8 The court also held that Louisiana law compels the award of attorney
fees to the class representatives, not pro rata among all class members.'
Alleging that the defendants had fixed infant formula prices, the Abbott plain-
tiffs brought a state court suit on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of
Louisiana consumers.1" Based on claims of both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction, the defendants removed the case to federal court.1" When the dis-
trict court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand to their chosen forum, the
defendants appealed the remand order to the Fifth Circuit. 2 At the time of the
Fifth Circuit's decision, the class had not been certified. 3 Rather, the Fifth
Circuit analyzed jurisdiction based on the plaintiffs' invocation of a putative
class. "4
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
First among the jurisdictional obstacles facing the defendants was that of
appellate jurisdiction. Had the district court based its remand order on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedure, then appellate
review would have been proscribed." In Abbott, the district court's remand deci-
sion, "[f]airly read," was an exercise of abstention.1" Seeking to avoid novel and
complex questions of state law, the district court remanded the named claims
pursuant to the Colorado River/Moses H. Cone abstention doctrine.17 The sup-
plemental claims of the unnamed class members were remanded for the addition-
al reason that these claims should not be split from the named claims.' 8 Thus,
because the district court decision was based on abstention grounds, the Fifth
Circuit had the opportunity to review the case and specifically could rule on the
novel jurisdictional issue therein framed.
6. 51 E3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
8. Abbott, 51 E3d at 526. The amount in controversy requirement has since been amended to in excess of
$75,000.28 U.S.C. § 1332.
9. Id.




14. Id. at 525 & n.1.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)(1994); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976); In re
Medscope Marine Ltd., 972 E2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1520 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1049 (1992).
16. In re Abbott Labs., 51 E3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1995).
17. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
18. Abbott, 51 E3dat 530.
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2. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Diversity Requirements Meet the Class
Action Device
The unique procedural posture-an appeal of an abstention order-allowed the
Fifth Circuit to address a jurisdictional issue of first impression in any federal
appellate court. A discussion of whether supplemental jurisdiction under the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990"' extends to unnamed class members who
lack amount-in-controversy had appeared years earlier in Fifth Circuit authority,
but had never been resolved.2" By the time Abbott was penned, proponents of
both positions could be found.21 In what the Fifth Circuit considered to be "inex-
plicably sharp language,"22 "Congressional sloth" was blamed for the judicial
uncertainty.2"
The criticized Congressional Act promulgated the general rule, codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), that supplemental jurisdiction exists over claims "related to"
and forming "part of the same case or controversy" of claims within original
jurisdiction.24 Subsection (b) provides a list of exceptions which does not
include class actions.2" Acknowledging that the omission of class actions from
the exception recital "may have been a clerical error,"2 the Fifth Circuit found
the statute, as passed, unambiguously to allow supplemental jurisdiction over
class action claims. Because the statute is "clear and does not demand an absurd
result," the Fifth Circuit refused to look further in interpreting Congress' Act.
2 7
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (as codified).
20. Twice prior to Abbott the Fifth Circuit discussed the issue but did not resolve it. More v. Intelcom
Support Serv., Inc., 960 E2d 466, 473 (5th Cir. 1992); Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 E2d 1014, 1021 (5th Cir.
1992), reh "g en banc granted, 990 E2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993).
21. Compare 1 JAMES W MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.97[5], at 928 (2d ed. 1994); 2
HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6.11, at 6-48 (3d ed. 1992); Joan
Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85, 103 (1992); Thomas C. Arthur &
Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY
L.J. 963, 981 (1991) (finding that Congress granted supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members
who individually do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement) with Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B.
Burbank, & Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion about Supplemental Jurisdiction? A
Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 960 n.90 (1991)(disagreeing).
22. In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 n.9. (5th Cir. 1995).
23. MOORE ET AL., supra at note 21, 0.97[5], at 928.
24. Section 1367 provides, in pertinent part,
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal
statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve
the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on sec-
tion 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsec-
tion (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under
Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exer-
cising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
25. Id.
26. Abbott, 51 E3d at 528 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 529 (citations omitted).
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Had the Fifth Circuit been willing, a further look would have revealed that the
Act's legislative history28 disclaims any intent to overrule the Supreme Court's
decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co.29 In contrast to Abbott, Zahn held
that the claims of each member in a class action must meet the amount-in-con-
troversy requirement.
Courts critical of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Abbott cite the contrary legisla-
tive history of § 1367 as authority." The district court in Waters v. Grosfel" 1
reasoned that "[i]t is unlikely that so much scholarly effort would have been
expended on the meaning and purpose of § 1367 if its meaning were clear."32 On
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit and others have opted to follow the Fifth
Circuit's lead.3
3. Entitlement to Attorney Fees: Class Representatives v. Class Members
Notably, the question of supplemental jurisdiction only arises once original
jurisdiction is established. Abbott's class representatives could meet the amount-
in-controversy requirement of original diversity jurisdiction if the attorney fees
potentially recoverable under state law were owed to the representatives, not to
the entire class. 4 Ironically, denying that their claims exceeded $50,000, the
plaintiffs argued that the attorney's fees must be divided by the number of class
members and distributed pro rata, in greatly fractionalized portions, to each class
member.3 Notwithstanding an intermediate appellate state court decision sup-
porting the plaintiffs' argument, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana attorney
fees are owed to the representatives alone.3 This decision was prompted by the
"plain text"37 of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 595, providing that
"[t]he court may allow the representative parties their reasonable expenses of liti-
gation, including attorney's fees, when as a result of the class action a fund is
made available . . . ."" The Abbott Court disagreed with a Ninth Circuit
decision39 that the policies behind Zahn forbid relegation of class members' fees
to class representatives. The Fifth Circuit explained that, "Zahn sheds little light
on the distinct policy choices behind Louisiana's decision regarding rights of
recovery by class members."4 As the Fifth Circuit considers Zahn to be legisla-
28. H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 & n.17.
29. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
30. Snider v. Stimson Lumber Co., 914 E Supp. 388, 391 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Waters v. Grosfeld, 904 F Supp.
616, 620 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
31. 904 E Supp. 616 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
32. Id. At 620 (quoting Leroy Cattle Co. v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 1994 WL 151105, at *13-14 (D. Kan.
March 2, 1994)).
33. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, 77 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1996); Gilmer v. Walt
Disney Co., 915 F Supp. 1001, 1010 (W.D. Ark. 1996).
34. In re Abbott Labs. 51 E3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1995).
35. Id.
36. See In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing White v. Board of Trustees, 276 So. 2d
714, 719 (La. Ct. App. 1973), writ rev'd, 279 So. 2d 694 (La. 1973) as a case "deducting pro rata shares of an
Article 595 attorney's fee from the awards due to each plaintiff").
37. Abbott, 51 E3d at 526.
38. Id.
39. Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678 E2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945 (1982).
40. Abbott, 51 E3d at 526.
[VOL. 17:255
CLASS ACTIONS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
tively overruled, the Ninth Circuit's rationale would not carry great weight in any
event. A more fundamental disparity underpinning the Fifth and Ninth Circuits'
analysis distills to a subtle Erie41 dispute. Both Abbott and the Ninth Circuit case
Goldberg v. CPC International, Inc.42 commenced in state court, consisted of
state law claims, and were removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Yet, in
deciding how attorney fees are counted for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the
Ninth Circuit found federal procedural law dispositive, while the Fifth Circuit
looked to state statutory law. Goldberg states that attorney's fees are authorized
pursuant to California statutory law, but the court relied on Zahn's description of
the amount-in-controversy requirement to analyze how the state authorized attor-
ney's fees would be counted for diversity purposes.43
In contrast, the Abbott Court invoked "the distinct policy choices behind
Louisiana's decision regarding rights of recovery by class members."" Abbott
acknowledged that Goldberg has a national following.4" The Abbott Court then
criticized Goldberg and its progeny on the grounds that "Goldberg's reading of
Zahn sheds little light on Louisiana law."4 This criticism misses the most signif-
icant differences in the Abbott and Goldberg analysis. Just as Abbott dissected
Louisiana law, the Goldberg Court could have examined the meaning of the anal-
ogous California statute. The Abbott Court first departed from Goldberg's rea-
soning by looking solely to state procedural statutes.47 Abbott's emphasis on
state sources is not explained, other than the comment that "[t]he district court
applied the law of Louisiana. Because it did so, we are persuaded that the indi-
vidual claims of the class representatives met the requisite jurisdictional
amount.
48
Courts outside of the Fifth Circuit have continued to follow Goldberg and dis-
tribute attorney's fees pro rata among all class members.49 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas followed Abbott's reasoning, but
arrived at the opposite result as a matter of Texas' procedural law."0 In the non-
41. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42. 678 E2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 1367. The Goldberg Court explained that,
We find that acceptance of either of CPC's theories [against pro rata distribution] would conflict
with the policy of Zahn v. International Paper Co., in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
"matter in controversy" requirement must be satisfied by each member of the plaintiff class.
Plaintiffs whose claims fall short cannot satisfy the requirement by aggregation of claims. CPC's
theories would seriously undermine and are contrary to the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in
Zahn. Thus we conclude that the potential attorneys' fees do not satisfy the jurisdictional amount
for this cause of action, and that there is, therefore, no federal jurisdiction.
Id.
44. Abbott, 51 E3d at 526.
45. Id. at 526 & n.3.
46. Id. at 526.
47. State law interpreting the procedural statute is not followed by Abbott, however. See Abbott, 51 E3d at
526 (citing White v. Board of Trustees, 276 So. 2d 714, 719 (La. Ct. App.), writ revd, 279 So. 2d 694 (La.
1973).
48. Abbott, 51 E3d at 527.
49. Ratliffv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 911 E Supp. 177, 179 (E.D.N.C. 1995); Gilman v. Wheat, 896 F. Supp.
507, 510 (D. Md. 1995). Notably, both Ratliff and Gilman hedged their continued support of Goldberg with the
findings that the relevant state statutes differed from Louisiana's.
50. Quebe v. Ford Motor Co., 908 E Supp. 446, 451-52 (WD. Tex. 1995).
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class action case Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 1 the Fifth Circuit itself distin-
guished Abbott and found amount-in-controversy by aggregating the punitive
damage claims of 512 plaintiffs in a joint, state-law tort action.52
4. Abstention
After finding federal jurisdiction existed, the Abbott Court held that the district
court erred in abstaining from the case. The district court remanded the named
plaintiffs' claims to state court on "the basis of ... the Colorado River/Moses H.
Cone53 doctrine of abstention." 4 The appellate court held that the alleged novel-
ty and complexity of state law issues was insufficient to justify remand. Only
exceptional circumstances justify Colorado River abstention.5"
Because the district court could not abstain from the named plaintiffs' claims
over which the court had original jurisdiction, the court had no justification, in
the Fifth Circuit's view, for declining jurisdiction over the supplemental claims of
the absent class members. Novel and complex state law issues had to be tackled
in the named plaintiffs' case anyway, the Abbott decision explained.56
Abbott's abstention analysis gives short shrift to the statutory language empow-
ering district courts to decline jurisdiction: "The district court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if - (1) the
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law . . . ."" On rehearing, the
Abbott panel did note that a "more ... developed record" might change the ulti-
mate decision on abstention. 8
B. Standing to Sue As a Class Representative
Every prospective class action plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is an
adequate representative of the class.59 A related issue, and one that may be raised
de novo and sua sponte on appeal, is whether the plaintiff has standing to bring
his or her claim. Weaving through federal case law on jurisdiction, federal legis-
lation, state legislation, and the pleadings in the record, the In re Taxable
Municiple Bond Securities Litigation6" court articulated two reasons why the
plaintiff's attempted class action failed for lack of standing.61 The standing
51. 63 E3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).
52. Id. at 1330 n.3 (distinguishing Abbott).
53. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
54. In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting district court decision) (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 529.
56. Id. at 530.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994). Although it is arguable that the issues will not be "novel" if the federal dis-
trict court must decide them as to the named plaintiffs, the plain language of the statute provides that a single
"novel or complex" issue of state law triggers the district court's discretionary power to decline jurisdiction.
The Abbott Court did not deny, and indeed appears to accept, that complex state law issues were present in the
case.
58. Abbott, 65 F.3d 33, 34 (5th Cir. 1995).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
60. 51 F.3d 518, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1995).
61. Id.
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issues, which were not even addressed by the district court, were dispositive of
the appeal. 2
In re Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation was initiated by the holders
of taxable municiple bonds issued by the Nebraska Investment Finance Authority
[hereinafter NIFA] for the purpose of facilitating agricultural loans. 3 The bond
proceeds were invested in Executive Life Insurance Company [hereinafter
ELIC], which, in turn, invested the funds in junk bonds. 4 When the junk bond
market collapsed, the bonds defaulted, and the bondholders sued under the
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act [hereinafter RICO].65 The
pleadings described a scheme to trick investors into thinking that they were buy-
ing safe, low-risk municipal bonds when they were in fact, buying junk bonds.66
The bondholders claimed that the defendants conspired to keep the bond pro-
ceeds under ELIC's control by making agricultural loans virtually impossible.6
Following the Supreme Court's RICO decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young,' the
bondholders' and purchasers' claims were either voluntarily dismissed or denied
on summary judgment.69
The class action litigated in the Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation
appeal was initiated by a Nebraska farmer, Anderson.70 Anderson's case, initially
filed in Nebraska, was transferred to Louisiana and consolidated with the bond-
holders' and purchasers' suits.71 Anderson sought to certify a class of small
Nebraska farmers and ranchers allegedly deprived of the ability to obtain agricul-
tural loans because of the defendants' actions.72 Anderson theorized that the
putative class held a legal entitlement to participate in a nonfraudulent loan pro-
gram, as the Nebraska legislature created and authorized NIFA to ameliorate the
class' economic difficulties.73 The district court dismissed Anderson's claim as
substantively defective under RICO.74
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but for different rea-
sons.75 Without reaching the substance of the district court's RICO analysis, the
Fifth Circuit held that Anderson lacked standing to challenge the defendants'
alleged misfeasance of the bond proceeds.76 Because standing is jurisdictional,
the court explained, the issue "remains open to review at all stages of the litiga-
tion."77 In addition to invoking plain vanilla standing authority, the Taxable
62. Id. at 521.
63. Id. at 519.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 520.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 519-20.
68. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).




73. Id. at 522.
74. Id. at 521.
75. Id. at 523-24.
76. Id. at 521-22.
77. Id. at 521 (quoting National Org. for Women, Inc., v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994)).
1997]
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Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court quoted the RICO requirement that
the plaintiff suffer injury to his or her business or property.78
Anderson lacked standing for two independent reasons articulated by the
Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court. "Anderson is not represen-
tative of the class," the court first explained.79 Articulating reasons reminiscent
of a Rule 23(a) inquiry into typicality and adequacy of class representation, the
Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court complained that Anderson
did not share the same interests as class members allegedly injured by the
scheme because Anderson failed to demonstrate his eligibility for the loans.8"
Anderson had obtained credit from other sources, and, thus, he did not qualify as
a farmer whom the Nebraska legislature intended to help.81 Anderson's personal
ability to obtain credit disqualified him from representing the class, regardless of
whether the class as a whole suffered from the junk bond debacle.82
The Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court quoted the 1974
Supreme Court opinion Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,83 a
decision denying standing to a putative class of all United States citizens
attempting to stop the Vietnam War. The Schlesinger Court explained that "[t]o
have standing to sue as a class representative[,] it is essential that a plaintiff must
be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury shared by all members of the class he represents."84 The Supreme
Court concluded that "standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of
the kind alleged here which is held in common by all members of the public...
,,85 The Schlesinger Court did not complain that the party before it lacked a par-
ticular injury; rather, the Court reasoned that a class of all citizens is impossible.
The Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court, by contrast, finds that
Anderson personally lacks standing to complain that "the class as a whole is enti-
tled to the loans."86 The Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court's
first standing analysis dovetailed, if not merged, standing with Rule 23(a)'s requi-
sites that the named class representative be an adequate representative of the
class and that the claims or defenses of the representative parties be typical of
those of the class.
The Taxable Municiple Bond Securities Litigation Court's second reason for
denying standing was that Anderson failed to show concrete injury to the class as
a whole.87 Anderson's attempt to quantify the injury by proving that alternate
loans carried higher interest rates was rejected because the ability to obtain any
78. Id. at 521 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)( 1994)). RICO provides that "[a]ny person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor ... and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1994).




83. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
84. Id. at 216 (citation omitted) (quoted in In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig., 51 F3d 518, 522 (5th Cir.
1995)).
85. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220.
86. In re Taxable Mun. Bond Secs. Litig., 51 E3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1995).
87. Id.
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loan disqualified farmers and ranchers from the NIFA program.88 The argument
that the putative class suffered a lost opportunity to borrow at a low interest rate
was discounted as too speculative. The court explained that speculative damages
and intangible property interests "are not compensable under RICO."89
II. RULE 23(a)'s REQUIREMENTS OF COMMONALITY,
TYPICALITY, ADEQUACY, AND NUMEROSITY
Rule 23 is structured such that four prerequisites to any federal class action
case are listed in subdivision (a).9" In subdivision (b), additional requisites are
defined, depending on the class action theory chosen. 1 Thus, subdivision (a)'s
requirements are universal; additional requirements depend on which subdivision
(b) category is advanced in the case.
A. Commonality and Typicality
A class must be defined such that "there are questions of law or fact common
to the class."92 "Although the threshold for commonality is not high, class certi-
fication requires at least two issues in common."93 Plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit
case Applewhite v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.," failed properly to plead a class
action because they asserted only one common issue.95
The "typicality" feature of class actions requires that "the claims or defenses of
the representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class."9
Typicality cannot be presumed absent a specific showing identifying common
questions of law or fact.97 The focus of typicality is on the similarity between the
named class members' legal and remedial theories and the represented class
members' legal and remedial theories. 8
Courts, not infrequently, group the typicality and commonality elements, as,
for example, in Shipes v. Trinity Industries.99 The Shipes Court defined the
threshold requisites for commonality and typicality as requiring "only that reso-
lution of the common questions affect all or a substantial number of the class
members.""1 ' The court affirmed certification of a class of employees from two
88. Id.
89. Id. at 523 (citing Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1994); Oscar v. University
Students Coop. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1020 (1992); Hecht v.
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 E2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1990)).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 573 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Stewart v. Winter,
669 F.2d 328, 335 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982)).
94. 67 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 1995).
95. Id. at 573.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
97. General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982) (further citations omitted).
98. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986).
99. 987 F.2d 311,316 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991 (1993). Commonality and typicality also
tend to merge with adequacy of representation. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147.
100. Shipes, 987 F.2d at 316.
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different plants alleging Title VII °0 claims against the same defendant. The dis-
trict court found consistencies in personnel procedures and criteria at the two
plants, including the same employee handbook, insurance and retirement pro-
grams, inter-plant transfers, and subjective decision making. 10 2 These consisten-
cies "clearly" demonstrated that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying a class of the two different categories of employees."0 '
B. Adequacy of Representation
For named parties seeking class action certification to qualify as representa-
tives of individuals not before the court, the named parties must "fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class."1 4 The requirement of fair and ade-
quate representation encompasses both class representatives and class counsel.
105
In McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles,0 6 a prisoner proceeding pro
se argued that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to amend his com-
plaint so that cases of similarly situated prisoners could be considered. 7 The
McGrew plaintiff's original complaint alleged that he was unconstitutionally
incarcerated pursuant to a Texas state statute which did not credit, for purposes
of calculating a sentence, time served under mandatory supervision."° The pris-
oner was sentenced to ten years in 1983 and was released to mandatory supervi-
sion in 1990.109 His mandatory supervision was subsequently revoked, and he
was incarcerated for the remainder of his ten year prison term. 1 McGrew
argued that any post-1993 incarceration - i.e., any incarceration after ten years
from the date of his ten year sentence - was unconstitutional.11 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint because, inter alia,
McGrew's conviction was not reversed on direct appeal.'12 McGrew's argument
that the district court erred in denying him leave to amend his petition to plead
the case of other prisoners was rejected on adequacy of representation grounds:
"because McGrew is proceeding pro se and his own complaint failed to state a
cause of action, his ability to serve as an adequate representative of the class is
dubious.""' 3
C. Numerosity of the Class
Invocation of the class action device requires that "the class [be] so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable."' 14 The numerosity requirement
101. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-bb4 (1994).
102. Shipes, 987 F.2d at 316.
103. Id. (citing Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 E2d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 1983)).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(4).
105. North Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Arnall, Golden & Gregory, 593 F.2d 642, 644 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979).
106. 47 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 159.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 159-60.
111. Id. at 160.
112. Id. at 160-61 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994)).
113. McGrew, 47 F.3d at 162 (citing Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 E2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973)).
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(1).
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depends not simply on the number of class members but also on geographical
dispersion of the class, the ease of class members' identification, and the size of
each plaintiff's claim."' 5 In Watson v. Shell Oil Co.,"' the Fifth Circuit cited
Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that the numerosity "requirement
imposes no mechanical rules."' 1 7 The Watson Court allowed a subclass of sixteen
where the larger class was comprised of more than eighteen thousand plaintiffs.
Without delineating how many class members would have been sufficiently
numerous, the Fifth Circuit in National Association of Government Employees v.
City Public Service Board"8 held that eleven was too small a number." 9 National
illustrates that numerosity refers not to the number of people which meet the class
definition, but to the number of people meeting the class definition who have
legal claims. The National Association of Government Employees Court refused
to count potential members of the class and instead accepted the argument that
only eleven claimants in a widely defined class had ripe, viable claims. 20
The National Association of Government Employees plaintiffs brought Texas
state and federal civil rights racial discrimination challenges against the defen-
dant employer. 2' Plaintiffs sought to define the class as all past, present, and
future employees and argued that the class, thus defined, met Rule 23's numeros-
ity requirement.' 22 Eschewing this broad definition, the Fifth Circuit explained
that "[t]he relevant inquiry is the number of class members who can complain of
particular acts demonstrating such intentional discrimination."' 23 In computing
the number of class members, the court eliminated all individuals whose claims
were prescribed and who could not allege discriminatory acts within the time
frame relevant to the case.'24 The National Association of Government
Employees Court distinguished the Fifth Circuit's previous decision Boykin v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.,"' in which the number of wrongfully withheld minority
promotions was determined to be only twenty. 2 In Boykin, the complaint was
statistically proven, in large part, and it was impossible to identify which of the
numerous employees would have received the theoretically appropriate twenty
promotions. 27 The pool of employees in National Association of Government
Employees was disparate, the court explained, because all but eleven of the
employees were known to be disqualified from any recovery.
2 8
115. Bradford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 673 E2d 792, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Zeidman v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 651 E2d 1030, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981)).
116. 979 E2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), later proceeding, 812 E Supp. 658, reh"g en banc granted, 990 E2d 805
(5th Cir. 1993).
117. Id. at 1022 & n.33 (citing General Tel. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)).
118. 40 E3d at 698.
119. Id. at 715-16.
120. Id. at715.
121. Id. at 702.
122. Id. at 715.
123. Id. at 715-16.
124. Id. at 716.
125. 706 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
126. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 E3d 698, 716 (5th Cir. 1994).
127. Boykin, 706 E2d at 1386-87.
128. NationalAss"n ofGov"t. Employees, 40 E3d at 716 n.27.
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III. INTER- AND INTRA-CIRCUIT BATTLES OVER RULE 23(b)
Rule 23(a) promulgates four general properties required in all manner of class
actions.129 In addition to meeting these four characteristics, the class must quali-
fy under one of the four sets of potential categories promulgated in subsection
(b): (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), or (b)(3).13 Classes certified pursuant to subdi-
vision (b)(3) must accord class members the opportunity to opt out of the class,
thereby preserving their rights to individualized judicial redress.131 The remain-
ing means of class certification may be non-opt-out, or mandatory.
A. Opt-Out Class Certification: Rule 23(b)(3) and the Tobacco Case
In "one of the most watched class actions ever," '132 Castano v. American
Tobacco Co.,1  the Fifth Circuit decertified an amorphous class of all nicotine
dependent persons in the United States.3 The district court aptly described the
Castano litigation as being "on a road certainly less traveled, if ever taken at
all."
13 5
The Castano plaintiffs charged cigarette manufacturers with addicting the
nation's past and present smokers.3 ' The attempted class case invoked the laws
of fifty states to support eight causes of action: fraud and deceit, negligent mis-
representation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and negli-
gent infliction for emotional distress, violation of state consumer protection
statutes, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and strict prod-
uct liability." 7 A ninth cause of action for redhibition was brought pursuant to
the Louisiana Civil Code. 3 ' The complaint sought compensatory and punitive
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
130. Id.
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Subdivision (c)(2) provides that
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance
through counsel.
Id.
132. In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 211 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
133. 84 E3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
134. Id. at 737.
135. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 ER.D. 544, 560 (E.D. La. 1995) rev d, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996), (citing EDWARD C. LATHAM, THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST, "THE ROAD NOT TAKEN" 105 (1969)).




CLASSACTIONS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
damages and attorney fees.139 The putative class consisted of "nicotine-depen-
dent" individuals, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association. 4 '
The district court conditionally certified the class, as allowed by Rule
23(c)(1). 4 ' The court also invoked subdivision (c)(4), certifying "particular
issues" only.'42 In distilling certifiable issues from uncertifiable ones, the district
court created four disparate categories: "(1) core liability; (2) injury-in-fact,
proximate cause, reliance and affirmative defenses; (3) compensatory damages;
and (4) punitive damages."
'13
Subdivision (b)(3) is commonly employed in class action cases for monetary
damages not limited to a common fund. The district court certified Castano pur-
suant to the following section:
(b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition: ... (3) the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C ) the desirability or undesir-
ability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 44
Thus, subdivision (b)(3) adds two additional requisites to 23(a)'s list - predomi-
nance and superiority. The district court sifted each of the four categories of
issues pursuant to the framework of subdivision (b)(3) and concluded that the
class partially and conditionally could be certified on core liability issues and
punitive damages.'
45
139. Id. The plaintiffs also sought equitable relief and a declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2),
which was denied by the district court. Id. This district court decision was not appealed by the plaintiffs. Id. at
738-39.
140. Id. at 737 n.1 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994)). The definition promulgated in the district court's decision is
(a) All cigarette smokers who have been diagnosed by a medical practitioner as nicotine-dependent;
and/or
(b) All regular cigarette smokers who were or have been advised by a medical practitioner that
smoking has had or will have adverse health consequences who thereafter do not or have not quit
smoking.
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 ER.D. 544, 561 (E.D. La. 1995).
141. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)("As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.").
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) ("When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated
as a class and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.").
143. Castano, 84 E3d at 739 (citing 160 ER.D. at 553-58).
144. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
145. Castano, 84 E3d at 738.
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The panel of Fifth Circuit judges in Castano disagreed and detailed its numer-
ous criticisms of the district court's methodology. The district court's predomi-
nance and superiority analysis was heavily dependent on its citation to the par-
tially certified asbestos class case Jenkins v. Raymark Industries.146 Citations to
Jenkins were no substitute for the exacting analysis demanded by the Castano
appellate panel.
1. Predominance
The Castano decision is specific in its description of where the district court
went wrong. With regard to "core liability" certification, the appellate court crit-
icized the absence of "any specific analysis regarding the multitude of issues."
'1 47
With regard to fraud, the lower court should have assessed the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims to discern whether reliance would be an issue in individual tri-
als.148 The district court's plan to defer analysis of how reliance would affect pre-
dominance until after trial was unacceptable.14 Further missing from the certifi-
cation decision was a determination of how variations in state law would affect
predominance. 15 1 Punitive damages also were not justified pursuant to an appro-
priate predominance critique.
15 1
The Fifth Circuit distilled its conviction that common issues did not predomi-
nate to two points: "First, [the district court] failed to consider how variations in
state law affect predominance and superiority. Second, its predominance inquiry
did not include consideration of how a trial on the merits would be conducted."
1 52
Castano explained at length that state law variations plagued the nationwide
class and criticized the appellees' "on faith" assertion that interstate differences
are academic.153 The district court's review of state law was described as "curso-
ry. '154 The district court's reliance on Jenkins as a prop for predominance was
misplaced because Jenkins involved the law of one state as to asbestos, a mature
tort. 155
The district court also failed to look beyond the pleadings to determine
whether the requirements of Rule 23 were met.15 6 Without such analysis, the pre-
dominance requirement would be written out of Rule 23, the Castano Court rea-
146. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
147. Castano, 84 E3d at 739. The Fifth Circuit explained that "[tihe court did not discuss why 'core liability'
issues would be a significant, rather than just common, part of each individual trial, nor why the individual




151. Id. at 740.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 741-43 & n.15.
154. Id. at 742.
155. The court explained the disparate nature of Jenkins:
The Jenkins Court, however, was not faced with managing a novel claim involving eight causes of
action, multiple jurisdictions, millions of plaintiffs, eight defendants, and over fifty years of alleged
wrongful conduct. Instead, Jenkins involved only 893 personal injury asbestos cases, the law of
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soned.'5 7 Expressing further concern for the maintenance of the integrity of Rule
23 as a whole, the panel explained that severing issues by nimble use of Rule
23(c)(4) is an unsuitable technique for manufacturing predominance."5 8
Castano's predominance analysis has been well received nationally. The
Eleventh Circuit has cited Castano for the proposition that class certification is
inappropriate if the laws of multiple states are at issue. 9 Discussing Castano in
support of its decision to decertify a medical products class action, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that while there is no per se bar to a multi-state class action,
differences in state law are difficult in products liability litigation. 6 ' The Fifth
Circuit's decision that the pleadings must be pierced to discern whether common
issues predominate also has been followed.' 6 '
2. Superiority
Citing the historic reluctance to certify mass torts, the Castano Court
expressed its concern that immature, and potentially nonviable torts, if granted
class status, would improperly burden defendants.' 62 "In the context of mass tort
class actions, certification dramatically affects the stakes for defendants," the
court explained.'63 Because the torts could be meritless, using the class action
vehicle would be unfair. The unknown outcome of a tobacco addiction case also
prevented plaintiffs from proving the existence of "negative value suits" - i.e.,
viable claims that must be adjudicated en mass if recovery is to exceed the cost
of litigation.'64 The possibility that tobacco addiction claims could prove invalid
also foiled the argument that the interests of judicial efficiency would be served
by aggregating the claims into one class case.' The district court's plan to
empanel a class jury for certified issues and a subsequent tier of second juries for
individual issues was not a superior method of case management, the Castano
Court found.'66 In addition to manageability problems, the fractioning of issues
between different juries offended the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a trial by
jury.167 The Castano panel's concern for preserving the Seventh Amendment in
this context has received favorable attention outside of the Fifth Circuit."
157. Id. at 744-45.
158. Id. at 745 n.21.
159. Andrews v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 E3d 1014, 1024 (1 lth Cir. 1996). See also In re Telectronics
Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 ER.D. 203, 211 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (discussing Castano in decision denying certification
of a products liability case on the basis of, inter alia, predominance and superiority grounds).
160. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996).
161. Schaefer v. Overland Express Family of Funds, 169 ER.D. 124, 127 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Appleton v.
Deloitte & Touche, 168 F.R.D. 221, 225 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
162. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 E3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 748.
165. Id. at 749.
166. Id. at 750.
167. Id.
168. Hayes v. Platex Family Prods. Corp., 168 ER.D. 292, 294-95 (D. Kan. 1996); Harding v. Tambrands,
Inc., 168 ER.D. 290, 291 (D. Kan. 1996).
19971
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
B. Non-Opt Out Class Certification
Three avenues are available for the creation of a class that is mandatory as to
its members. A class may be mandatory if the relief requested is injunctive or
declaratory, as opposed to monetary:
(b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . . (2) the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole[.]' 69
The Fifth Circuit in Chandler v. City of Dallas170 reversed the certification of
an injunctive class in a Rehabilitation Act171 case. The putative class plaintiffs
challenged a defendant employer's job classification program which disqualified
plaintiffs from Primary Driver jobs due to sight imperfections or diabetes. "The
district court certified two classes of plaintiffs[,] those with substandard vision
and those with insulin dependence. '172 The Fifth Circuit decertified the class on
the grounds that "the effect of a given type of impairment, both on major life
activities in general and on a person's ability to perform specific tasks, can vary
widely from individual to individual. ' 173 This analysis is reminiscent of a typi-
cality or commonality critique, but was not specifically designated as such by the
Chandler Court.
The two final categories of classes require that
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not par-
ties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests[.] 
174
The mandatory class of future asbestos victims allowed in In re Asbestos
Litigation (Flanagan v. Ahearn) 75 was certified by the district court under both
prongs of subdivision (b)(1), as well as under (b)(2). 7 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit chose to affirm pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(B), 77 commonly refer-
enced as the "limited fund" provision. In Ahearn, the defendant asbestos manu-
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
170. 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994).
171. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 7(8)(B)(i), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(i) (1994).
172. Chandler, 2 E3d at 1389.
173. Id. at 1396.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
175. 90 E3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
176. Id. at 974.
177. Id. at 982-88.
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facturer, Fibreboard, was itself found to be a limited fund because the value of
future, valid claims against it exceeded its assets. Objections that this rationale
confects an end-run around the Bankruptcy Code were rejected by the appellate
court.178 The plain language of Rule 23 "compels a flexible construction," the
court found."9 Further, Ahearn reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code was not
intended as an exclusive remedy for distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets. 80
The Ahearn Court also believed that (b)(1)(B) certification was a superior alter-
native to bankruptcy. 8' The United States Supreme Court cursorily vacated the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Ahearn, and remanded the case for dispensation con-
sistent with the high Court's decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
which affirmed the Third Circuit's decertification of an exposure-only asbestos
class.182 Amchem addressed a similar class action settlement, the primary differ-
ence being that Amchem was a subsection (b)(3) class, and thus allowed opt-outs.
Amchem did not render a holding on limited funds because the class therein was
not certified pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(B) 3 Amchem places the Fifth
Circuit's initial decision in Ahearn on precarious grounds, for reasons addressed
in the next section. However, because the Fifth Circuit could reconsider Ahearn
without revisiting the limited fund issue, the first Ahearn appellate decision may
retain some vestige of authority on the issue of subdivision (b)(1)(B).
IV SETTLEMENT CLASSES
Subdivision (e) of Rule 23 requires that class members be given notice of a set-
tlement, and that the settlement be approved by the court.18 The requirements
for court approval of a settlement class are the subject of ongoing controversy
nationwide. The Ahearn case pitted the Fifth Circuit against the Third Circuit on
the question of the standards applicable for settling a class action. The Supreme
Court resolved this inter-circuit confliction in Amchem.
From the $1.535 billion deal cut at midnight during a chance meeting in a
Tyler, Texascoffee shop,185 to one appellate judge's allegations of "dirty work"
178. Id. at 982-83.
179. Id. at 984.
180. Id. at 984-85.
181. Id. at 985.
182. In re Asbestos Litig.(Flanagan v. Ahearn), 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.
Ct. 2231 (1997) (this case commonly has been referenced as Georgine based on its title in the Third Circuit).
183. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2251 ("this is not a 'limited fund' case certified under Rule 23(b)(l)(B)")
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides the following:
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
Id.
185. Ahearn, 90 F.3d at 971. The decision recounts a portion of the negotiations as follows:
Judge Parker and counsel spent the afternoon of August 26 in intensive negotiating sessions in an
attempt to resolve the remaining differences between the parties. Late in the afternoon when settle-
ment had not been reached, Judge Parker invited a core group of attorneys to his home outside of
Tyler to continue the discussion. After several hours of negotiations in this more informal setting,
Continental agreed to contribute an additional $25,000,000 and Fibreboard agreed to contribute
$10,000,000. Plaintiffs' counsel refused at this point to accept the $1.535 billion pot. But later, the
key parties, by coincidence, met around midnight at a Tyler coffee shop. Plaintiffs' counsel, at that
time, agreed to accept the tendered $1.535 billion global settlement offer.
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and "exploitation" of "uniquely vulnerable" victims,'86 the Ahearn case is high
drama at high stakes. Ahearn "is the first no-opt-out, mass-tort, settlement-only,
futures-only class action ever attempted or approved."'1 87 A sharply divided panel
of the Fifth Circuit allowed certification, and a majority of the regular active
members of the circuit did not vote to rehear the case en banc.' 88  However, in
light of the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of the Third Circuit case
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. ,189 "the sound and the fury"'90 of the Ahearn
acrimony will, like Macbeth's reign, "signify[] nothing"'' in the end: the high
Court has commanded that the Fifth Circuit conform Ahearn to the Court's deci-
sion in Amchem.
The Fifth Circuit's Ahearn decision was issued on the heels of the Third
Circuit's decertification of a similar settlement class of future asbestos victims.'92
The Third Circuit's decision held that parties cannot settle what they cannot certi-
fy. 93 In other words, for a case to be settled as a class, the case must qualify for
litigation as a class. 94 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, promulgating "[t]he rule that
a court should con-sider a proposed settlement, if one is before it, when decid-
ing certification issues .... ""'
Thus, the Ahearn majority's finding of subdivision (a) elements was dependent
upon the existence of the settlement.'96 Commonality was gleaned from the
"issues in common under the settlement."' 97 Typicality challenges successful in
Castano, such as variations in state law, were rejected by the Ahearn majority
because the settlement instituted a trust for future distributions. The differences
in individual tort claims "do not affect the settlement in the least," the majority
reasoned.' 98 Adequacy of representation challenges to class counsel's alleged
conflicts of interest were denied after a detailed analysis of the settlement negoti-
ations.' 99 The majority surmised that, with regard to one potential conflict, "[t]o
186. Id. at 994 (Smith, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 993.
188. In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 101 F.3d 368, 369 (5th Cir. 1996). Judge Smith, joined by
Judges Garwood, Jolly, Jones, Garza, and DeMoss, dissented from the circuit's failure to hear Ahearn en banc.
This dissent explains that:
[flive of the active judges are disqualified from participating in this matter [King, Higginbotham,
Barksdale, Benavides, and Parker], and a sixth judge [Dennis] has elected not to participate in the
consideration of the suggestion for rehearing en bane. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine
whether, if all active judges were voting, a majority would decide to rehear this case en banc.
The applicable statute and rules require the affirmative vote of a majority of the active judges-
here, nine of the seventeen active judges-for en banc consideration, as recused and nonparticipat-
ing judges are counted as members of the court for purposes of the calculation. The effect in this
case is to require not a simple majority, but a supermajority of 820/--nine of the eleven participat-
ing judges-to favor consideration.
Id. (footnote omitted).
189. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
190. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5.
191. Id.
192. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 610.
193. Id. at617-18.
194. Id. at618.
195. In re Asbestos Litig., (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963,975 (5th Cir. 1996).
196. Id. Subsection (b) was satisfied pursuant to the theory that Fibreboard itself is a limited fund. Id. at 982-83.
197. Id. at 976.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 977-78.
[VOL. 17:255
CLASS ACTIONS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
distinguish between the two groups in the Global Settlement Agreement was
impractical .. . .""' Thus, regarding whether claims for future personal injuries
arising under the laws of fifty different states could comply with typicality, com-
monality, and adequacy, the settlement agreement itself repeatedly supplied an
affirmative answer.
The Ahearn litigation is unique, the majority opinion explains, because the par-
ties had unique reasons to settle. Fibreboard, an asbestos manufacturer, and its
insurers were litigating coverage issues in California. The insurers would only
settle for "total peace'" which required a mandatory class action of individuals
who would contract asbestos-related diseases in the future.0 1 Fibreboard
approached the plaintiffs' counsel, who then represented the future victims in the
case. The class action law suit and the class action settlement were filed on the
same day.2"2 The Ahearn majority considered the settlement to be a good result
for future victims; the victims escape the risk that Fibreboard would lose the cov-
erage case, and the victims would receive some compensation from the trust fund
instituted by the settlement.
On the other hand, an impassioned dissent by Judge Jerry E. Smith described
"[the] case [as] an affront to the integrity of the judicial system."2 3 "This suit
was supposedly brought on behalf of Fibreboard's victims," the dissent main-
tained, "but of the four entities directly affected by the settlement - Fibreboard,
class attorneys, courts, and asbestos victims - the victims were the only entity
absent from the bargaining table. Perhaps for that reason, they also were the only
losers."2 4 Judge Smith explained that there was no need to involve the plaintiff
class in the coverage dispute between Fibreboard and its insurers and that
Fibreboard only contributed $10 million of its $225-250 million net worth.205
"[T]he class members appear[ed] to have traded Fibreboard's liability for nothing
to which they did not already have a right."206 The dissent bemoaned the future
implications of the Ahearn precedent:
The unique fact of the insurance dispute is simply irrelevant, and the other
unique facts - a corporate defendant's hand-picking class counsel, cutting a
side deal, reaching a "global settlement" affecting only "future" plaintiffs, and
choosing a sympathetic judge to approve the settlement - likely will become
far too common now that the majority has approved of them.207
Judge Smith's dissent was cited by the Supreme Court in Amchem as general
support for the proposition that notice to exposure-only claimants - who suffer
no present injury but may become sick in the future - is "highly problematic."208
200. Id. at 982.
201. Id. at 968, 970.
202. Id. at 968-74, 988.
203. Id. at 994 (Smith, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 993.
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1343, 1420 (1995)).
207. Ahearn, 90 E3d at 994.
208. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997) (also citing the Third Circuit's opinion,
83 E3d at 633).
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The decertified Amchem class and the Ahearn class both purported to resolve
future claims of asbestos victims suffering no present injury.20 9 Also settled in
both cases were such victims' family members' claims. The Court in Amchem
was troubled that many class members "may not even know of their exposure, or
realize the extent of the harm they may incur," and that "large numbers of people
•. . - future spouses and children of asbestos victims - could not be alerted to
their class membership. 210
On reconsideration consistent with Amchem, the Fifth Circuit will be hard
pressed to justify notice to a substantially similar class. Although the Supreme
Court denied "definitively" ruling on notice because its disapproval of the class
on other grounds supported decertification,211 the Court signaled that notice to
"legions so unselfconscious and amorphous" 212 was not likely to be deemed ade-
quate. To the extent that the Amchem and Ahearn classes differ, the injustices
inherent in inadequate notice are more acute in Ahearn, because in that case class
members had to decide not whether to execute the two Amchem opt-out forms,
but whether to take the significantly more onerous step of opposing a mandatory
settlement.
The survival of Ahearn as a class action resolving all future asbestos claims
against Fibreboard is unlikely for the further reason that the Supreme Court
approved the Third Circuit's interpretation of settlement classes in material
part.2 3 Rule 23's settlement provision, subsection (e), provides that: "A class
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in such manner as the court directs. '214 Adopting the Third
Circuit's fundamental approach to the operation of settlement classes under Rule
23, the Supreme Court stated that this subsection "was designed to function as an
additional requirement, not a superseding direction.' 1" The Fifth Circuit thus
lost the competition with the Third: the Ahearn majority erroneously believed
that the class action requisites could be satisfied "under the settlement," not inde-
pendent of it.21" As compared to the Ahearn analysis, the rule promulgated in
209. Recognizing the problems caused by the latency period for asbestos-related illnesses is a key to under-
standing why these two settlement cases are somewhat unique in the class action arena. Asbestos defendants
and their insurers sought an end to future litigation - litigation possible because decades typically intervene
between exposure to asbestos and injury from exposure. These cases sought a present end to damage suits for
future injuries. The Supreme Court's decision in Amchem recounted the history of asbestos litigation:
[This] is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the
1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning
in the 1970s. On the basis of past and current filing data, and because of a latency period that may
last as long as 40 years for some asbestos related diseases, a continuing stream of claims can be
expected.
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2237 (quoting Report of The Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation 2-3 (Mar. 1991)).
210. Id. at 2252.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2249 ("[W]e conclude that the Third Circuit's appraisal is essentially correct.").
214. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(e).
215. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
216. See In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 E3d 963, 976 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he class holds the
above issues in common under the settlement"; "[T]he issues that brought the named plaintiffs to settle Ahearn
are the same issues that the district court found common to the entire class.").
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Amchem is more restrictive regarding the extent to which the settlement itself can
bootstrap the elements of class certification. The Supreme Court explained that:
[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems, for the proposal is that there be no trial. But
other specifications of the rule - those designed to protect absentees by block-
ing unwarranted or overbroad class definitions - demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such attention is of vital impor-
tance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity,
present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings
as they unfold.217
Amchem dictates that whether the action is settled or tried, the class must have
"sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of
class representatives. 218
In conforming its Rule 23(a) analysis to Amchem 's demand for extra-settlement
unity, the Fifth Circuit will have difficulty duplicating its previous decision in
Ahearn. The Supreme Court in Amchem holds that the class action therein failed
for lack of predominance, a subsection (b)(3) element not at issue in Ahearn.
With regard to commonality and typicality, Amchem renders no literal holding,
and even states that "the predominance criteria is far more demanding" than the
commonality criteria.219 The high Court's rationale nonetheless supersedes
Ahearn 's. The Supreme Court reasoned: "[i]f a common interest in a fair com-
promise could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), that vital
prescription would be stripped of any meaning in the settlement context."22 This
analysis renders Ahearn 's approach to typicality and commonality questionable,
at best. Ahearn reasoned that the class shared "interests in maximizing recovery
for the class and eliminating the risk posed by the insurance coverage litiga-
tion" '221 - in other words, interests rising from the settlement. The Ahearn court
also cited the fact that all members were exposed to Fibreboard's asbestos.222
The significance of this fact is limited in light of Amchem's recital of multiple
differences equally plaguing the Ahearn class: different state laws, different
times of exposure, different means of exposure, different illnesses, different
chances of developing any injury, different factual scenarios relevant to causa-
tion, different medical expenses, and different medical histories.
22 3
The Ahearn majority attempted to distinguish the commonality and typicality
problems therein from the Amchem case on the grounds that Ahearn only
resolved insurance coverage issues and established "an equitable distribution
process to insure that all class members receive compensation." '224 Amchem "s
217. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 (internal citations to Rule 23 and footnote omitted).
218. Id. at 2248.
219. Id. at 2250 (citation omitted).
220. Id. at 2249-50.
221. Ahearn, 90 E3d at 976.
222. Id.
223. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting the Third Circuit's decision, 83 F.3d at 626).
224. Ahearn, 90 E3d at 976 n.8.
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conclusion speaks to the issue of judicially-confected equitable distribution
schemes: "[t]he argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative
claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient
means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has
not adopted such a solution."22
More particularly foreboding to the Ahearn class' survival is Amchem s hold-
ing that the adequacy of representation element was not satisfied in that case.
The Amchem Court reasoned that class representatives must possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members, and that to this end
commonality and typicality merge into the adequacy requirement.22 6 Fatal to
Ahearn, the Amchem Court was not satisfied that common interest in settlement
equates with the same interest, or that exposure to asbestos renders all injuries
the same. The Amchem Court complained that interests were not aligned on the
particulars of the settlement.227 In addition, the Amchem and Ahearn certifica-
tions both proceeded without the creation of subclasses, and this omission in
Amchem was sharply criticized by the Supreme Court.228 Scrutinized pursuant to
Amchem 's edicts, the Ahearn court was simply wrong in rationalizing that,
because Fibreboard would not settle unless members of all subclasses were
bound by the deal, subclasses were unnecessary.229
Therefore, when the Ahearn panel, on remand review, considers the propriety
of class certification pursuant to the Amchem blue print, the reasoning, and most
probably the result, will change. Judged pursuant to the United States Supreme
Court's recent ruling on class action settlements, the Ahearn class certification is
deficient in terms of notice and adequacy of representation, with typicality and
commonality being questionable as well.
V CONCLUSION
Supreme Court guidance and amendment to Rule 23 likely will change the
face of individual issues, but not necessarily the controversy as a whole. Jurists
and commentators are likely to continue to debate the merits of mass, representa-
tional litigation. Fractionalized opinions will prevail as long as some continue to
view class representation with suspicion, while others favor the utility of an
inclusive litigation device.
225. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2252 (internal footnote omitted).
226. Id. at 2251 & n.20 (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 2251. As an example, the currently injured claimants, some of whom could be included in the
class if they had not filed suit before January 15, 1993, had an interest in immediate payment, whereas
claimants without current injury had an interest in insuring that enough money remained to pay them in the
future in the event that they manifest an illness. Id.
228. Id. The Court quoted a Second Circuit decision for the proposition that, "'we know of no authority that
permits a court to approve a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a
unitary class."' Id. (quoting In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721, 742-743
(2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh "g sub nom., 993 F2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993)).
229. Ahearn, 90 F.3d at 982 (explaining why subclasses were unnecessary for groups exposed before and
after insurance coverage; other subclasses were demanded, without avail, by the intervenors, see id. at 976-81).
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